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Abstract—Fifth generation (5G) dense small cell networks
(SCNs) are expected to meet the thousand-fold mobile traffic
challenge within the next few years. When developing solution
schemes for resource allocation problems in such networks, con-
ventional centralized control is no longer viable due to excessive
computational complexity and large signaling overhead caused by
the large number of users and network nodes in such a network.
Instead, distributed resource allocation (or decision making)
methods with low complexity would be desirable to make the
network self-organizing and autonomous. Minority game (MG)
has recently gained attention of the research community as a
tool to model and solve distributed resource allocation problems.
The main objective of this article is to study the applicability
of the MG to solve the distributed decision making problems in
future wireless networks. We present the fundamental theoretical
aspects of basic MG, some variants of MG, and the notion of
equilibrium. We also study the current state-of-the-art on the
applications of MGs in communication networks. Furthermore,
we describe an example application of MG to SCNs, where the
problem of computation offloading by users in an SCN is modeled
and analyzed using MG.
Index Terms—5G small cells, distributed resource allocation,
congestion problems, self-organization, minority game (MG).
I. INTRODUCTION
The next generation of wireless networks, also known as
5G, is expected to face a thousand-fold growth in mobile
data traffic due to the increased smart device usage, prolif-
eration of data hungry applications and pervasive connectivity
requirement. Since the existing traditional macro cellular net-
works are not designed to cope with such large data traffic,
network densification using small cell base stations (SBS) and
implementation of small cell networks (SCNs) are proposed. In
particular, SCNs are expected to improve the efficiency of the
utilization of radio resources, including energy and spectrum.
Although SCNs might become the key enablers of 5G,
they impose some challenges that need to be addressed. For
instance, the typical wireless resource allocation problems
become more complicated in a dense network. Since the
SCNs are expected to be hyper-dense and multi-tier, they must
be self-organizing and self-healing, to avoid high complexity
and fault-intolerance of central management. In other words,
network management tasks such as resource allocation are
preferred to be performed in a distributed manner. Also the
unavailability of global and precise channel state information
in dense networks needs to be addressed. Moreover, feedback
and signaling overhead should be minimized. In order to
address these challenges, in this paper we focus on the
minority game (MG) and its potential applications to solve
the distributed decision making/control problems that arise in
5G SCNs.
Minority game has recently gained attention of the research
community as a tool to model congestion problems encoun-
tered in wireless networks. In simple terms, in an MG, an
odd number of players select between two alternatives in the
hope of being in the minority, because only the minority group
receives a pay-off. Thus, an MG is able to model a congested
system with a large number of agents competing for shared
resources, where pair-wise communication between agents
does not take place. This finds application in 5G SCNs that
accommodate a large number of users, where congestion can
occur due to the scarcity of the (radio and/or computational)
resources. In such scenarios, users would naturally prefer to
select the less-crowded option. Moreover, MG involves self-
organized decision making with minimal external information
available to the agents as desired in dense SCNs.
When developing distributed solution schemes for wire-
less resource allocation problems, conventional distributed
approaches (e.g. those based on traditional game theory) are
not always applicable, since such models become increasingly
complex for systems with large number of agents. In essence,
many such game models require pairwise interactions among
the agents. In contrast, the agents’ interaction in MG exhibit
mean field like behavior [1]; i.e., an individual agent interacts
with the aggregate behavior of all other agents. This makes
MG a promising technique, especially since mean field based
models are widely used as fitting tools to model large sys-
tems that are often studied in distributed resource allocation
problems.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section II,
the basic concepts, some variants, and equilibrium notions of
MG are discussed. Section III describes the state-of-the-art ap-
plications of minority games in communication networks and
outlines potential future applications and research directions.
In Section IV, an example application of MG for distributed
computational offloading is presented before the article is
concluded in Section V.
II. MINORITY GAMES: BASICS, EQUILIBRIUM, SOLUTION
APPROACHES, AND VARIANTS
A. Basics of a Minority Game
The concept of MG stems from El Farol bar problem [2],
and was initially formulated and presented in [3]. In the most
basic setting of such a game, an odd number of players choose
between two actions while competing to be in the minority
group through selecting the less popular action, since only
the minority receives a reward. After each round of play, all
players are informed of the winning action, which is then used
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2as history data by the players to improve the decision making
in the upcoming rounds. Let us denote the two actions by 0 and
1. Moreover, the action of player i at time t is shown by ai(t).
The number of players (N ) is required to be an odd number
to avoid ties. Each player has a given set of decision making
strategies that help her select future actions. A strategy predicts
the winning action of the next round based on the previous m
number of winning actions, with m being the size of memory,
also known as the brain size. In other words, a strategy is
essentially a mapping of the m-bit length history string (µ(t))
to an action. An example strategy table for an agent is given in
Table I, where the agent has two strategies S1 and S2. Since
there are two actions to select from, it is clear that the strategy
space consists of 22
m
total number of strategies, which become
very large even for small m. Thus, reduced strategy space
(RSS) is introduced to make the strategy space remarkably
smaller without any significant impact on the dynamics of
the MG. RSS is formulated by choosing 2m strategy pairs so
that in each pair, one strategy is anti-correlated to the other.
In other words, the predictions given by one strategy are the
exact opposites of the predictions given by the other strategy
[4]. An example for two anti-correlated strategies is shown
in Table I. Thus RSS constitutes of 2m+1 total number of
strategies, which is much smaller than the size of universal
strategy space 22
m
.
TABLE I
AN EXAMPLE STRATEGY TABLE FOR AN AGENT
History string Predicted winning action
S1 S2
00 1 0
01 1 0
10 0 1
11 0 1
At the outset of the game, each agent randomly draws S
strategies from the strategy space which remain fixed for each
player throughout the game. There is no a priori best strategy.
Intuitively, if such strategy exists, all agents would use it
and therefore lose due to the minority rule, which contradicts
the initial assumption. As the game is played iteratively,
each player evaluates her own strategies as follows: The
strategies that make accurate predictions about the winning
action are given a point and the poorly performing strategies
are penalized. In other words, strategies are reinforced as they
predict the winning action over a number of plays. Note that
all strategies are scored after each round regardless of being
used by the agent or not. Thus the score of each strategy is
updated after each round of play according to its performance
and the players use the strategy with the largest accumulated
score at each round. Each player’s objective is to maximize
her utility over the time as she plays the game repeatedly. In
MG, often the players compete for a limited resource without
communicating with each other. Consequently, since players
do not have any knowledge about other players’ decisions, the
decision making becomes almost autonomous [1].
B. Properties of a Minority Game
The properties of a minority game are described by the
following parameters and behaviors:
• Attendance: One of the most important parameters of an
MG is the collective sum of the actions of all players at
a given time t, known as the attendance, A(t).
• Volatility: Basically, the attendance value never settles
but fluctuates around the mean attendance (i.e. cut-off
value) [1]. The fluctuation around the mean attendance
is known as volatility, σ. Volatility is an inverse measure
of the system’s performance and hence, the term σ2/N
corresponds to an inverse global efficiency. When the
fluctuations are smaller, that implies that the size of the
minority, thus the number of winners, is larger. Hence,
smaller volatility corresponds to higher users’ satisfaction
levels along with better resource utilization. It is known
that volatility depends on the ratio 2m/N , which is
commonly referred to as the training parameter or control
parameter (Let α = 2m/N ) [1][4][5]. (An example
follows in Section IV, in particular in Fig. 2.)
• Phase transition: Using the variation of the global effi-
ciency w.r.t. α (See also Fig. 2), it can be seen that the
game is divided into two phases by the minimum value of
α (denoted by α∗), namely crowded phase and uncrowded
phase. MG is said to be in the crowded phase when
α < α∗. This is because, for smaller m, the number of
strategies, 22
m
, is quite smaller compared to the number
of agents N , thus many agents could be using the same
strategy, leading them to make the same decision. This
then creates a herding effect, causing the MG to enter
the crowded phase. Once α > α∗, the m values are large
enough to make the strategy space larger than the number
of agents N , so that the probability of any two agents
using identical strategies diminish, thus making MG enter
the uncrowded phase. Note that, α∗ corresponds to the
minimum volatility indicating the system’s ability to self-
organize into a state where the number of satisfied agents
and the resource utilization are maximized. Moreover, it
is shown that the performance of MG surpasses that of
the random choice game (where all agents choose each
action with a probability = 0.5) for a certain range of
α values. This is referred to as the better than random
regime [1][4][6][7].
• Predictability: This is an important physical property of
MG. It measures the information content in the previous
set of attendance values, that is available to agents.
Predictability is denoted by H , where H = 0 corresponds
to the situation in which the game outcome is unpre-
dictable. Moreover, the predictability is the parameter
that characterizes the two phases in the MG. In MG,
H = 0 for α < α∗ and H 6= 0 for α > α∗. This
implies that during the crowded phase, the game outcome
is unpredictable and when MG enters uncrowded phase,
the game outcome becomes more predictable [4].
3C. Equilibrium Notions for an MG
In this section, we provide a brief introduction to the notion
of equilibria of MG. The reader is encouraged to look further
(e.g. [6], [7]) for an in-depth tutorial.
Assuming the number of agents is an odd number equal to
N , an MG is in an equilibrium if each of the two alternatives is
selected by (N − 1)/2 and (N +1)/2 agents. Then, no agent
would gain by unilaterally deviating from its state since, if
any of the agents in majority group does so, the groups would
switch thus the state of the deviated agent would not improve.
In an MG stage game, three types of Nash equilibria (NE) are
applicable. Note that the NE corresponds to the local minima
of volatility values [7].
• Pure strategy Nash equilibria: If there are N agents
playing the MG and (N − 1)/2 of them choose to
select one alternative with probability = 1 while the
other (N + 1)/2 agents select the other alternative with
probability = 1, system is said to be in a pure strategy
NE. There are
(
N
N−1
2
)
+
(
N
N+1
2
)
number of such NEs that
exist. These NEs are considered the globally optimal
states [6].
• Symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibria: There exists
only a single symmetric mixed strategy NE to the MG. It
corresponds to the so called random choice game where,
all agents choose between each of the two alternatives
with a probability of 0.5 [6].
• Asymmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibria: If (N−1)/2
agents select one alternative with probability = 1, another
(N − 1)/2 agents select the other alternative with proba-
bility = 1 and the remaining agent selects an alternative
with an arbitrary mixed probability, the MG stage game
is said to be in an asymmetric mixed strategy NE. There
can be an infinite number of such NEs [6].
D. Solution Approaches
Both qualitative and analytical approaches have been studied
in the literature to solve an MG. The qualitative approach
investigates how the volatility of the system varies with respect
to the brain size and the population size. Moreover, it interprets
the phase transitions of MG from the crowded phase to the
uncrowded phase along with the volatility variation. Hence,
this approach is also referred to as crowd-anticrowd theory in
the literature [4]. A brief overview of the phase transition in
MG in relation to the variation of volatility is given in Section
II-B. The interested reader can find more rigorous explanations
in [7].
The analytical solution of MG obtains its statistical char-
acterizations of the stationary states and the NE. In MG, the
stationary states correspond to the minima of predictability
whereas the NE of the MG correspond to the minima of
volatility. In order to derive the analytical solutions, numerous
mathematical techniques are used, including reinforcement
learning, replicator dynamics, and tools from statistical physics
of disordered systems (e.g. Hamiltonian, replica method, spin
glass model, Ising model). Reference [6] includes a rigorous
analysis on the solution of MG where aforementioned tech-
niques are employed to derive the solution. Therein, complete
statistical characterizations of the stationary state of MG are
realized. First, the authors use multi-population replicator
dynamics technique to obtain some evolutionarily stable NEs
of the stage game. Then, a generalized version of the repeated
MG model is analyzed where exponential learning is used by
the agents to adapt their strategies.
For this scenario, analysis is done considering two different
types of agents, namely naive1 and sophisticated.2 In their
analysis the authors show that for the repeated MG with naive
agents, stationary state is not a NE. Moreover, authors show
that for the systems with sophisticated agents and exponential
learning, the system converges to a NE.
E. Variants of the Minority Game
In this section, we briefly introduce few different variations
of MG beyond the basic form described before. A compre-
hensive discussions can be found in [4], [5] and [8], among
many others.
1) MG with arbitrary cut-off : A generalized version of the
basic MG, referred to as MG with arbitrary cut-offs is
introduced in [5]. In such games, the minority rule is
defined at an arbitrary cut-off value (φ) rather than the
50% cut-off used in the seminal MG. In [5], authors
show the behavioral change of MG when the cut-off
value is varied. In brief, it is shown that the attendance
values fluctuate around the new cut-off, exhibiting the
adaptation of the population. Furthermore, the analysis
shows that when the cut-off φ is decreased below N/2,
the brain size yielding the minimum volatility is also
decreased. This variant is particularly useful to model
some resource allocation problems where the comfort
value (also known as the cut-off) of the capacity of
a particular resource is a value other than 50%. The
MG model for the problem of computation offloading
presented in Section IV in this article counts as an
example.
2) Multiple-choice MG (Simplex game): This variant is
introduced in [8] as a direct generalization of the basic
MG where every agent might select among K different
choices (K > 2). Thus, a simplex game is defined by the
set of N players, the set of K choices and the history
winning actions (m-bit long). Similar to the seminal
MG, a strategy is a mapping of the history data to one
of the K choices, and each player is given a set of S
strategies. Moreover, the strategy space of the simplex
game is associated with probability values pis, which
indicates the satisfaction of the ith agent with her sth
strategy. Each player’s choice is referred to as a bid and
a quantity called aggregate bid is defined as the sum
of the choices of all agents. Similar to the attendance
property in the basic MG, the aggregate bid contains
the information about the number of agents that select a
1In seminal MG, the agents are naive, since they only know the pay-off
received by the played strategies.
2Unlike naive agents, sophisticated agents are assumed to have the knowl-
edge of the pay-off they would receive for any strategy that they play
(including the strategies that are not played). More details on naive and
sophisticated agents can be found in [6].
4given choice and determines the pay-off that each user
receives. As the game is played iteratively, after scoring
the strategies, the probability values (pis) are updated
using the exponential learning3 method. Thus, although
the players start out naive, they become sophisticated
as the game evolves. Therefore, unlike basic MG, the
simplex game exhibits evolutionary behavior. In [8],
it is shown that compared to playing an MG with
few options, in a game with a large action set, the
overall system performance improves, resulting in higher
resource utilization.
3) Evolutionary MG (Genetic model): In this version of
MG, unlike the basic case, all users apply a single
strategy. Each agent i chooses the action predicted by
the strategy with some probability pi referred to as
the agent’s gene value. Each agent selects the opposite
action with probability 1 − pi. At each play, +1 (or
−1) point is assigned to each agent in the minority
(or majority). As the game evolves, if the accumulated
score falls below a certain threshold, a new gene value
is drawn (known as mutation of gene value) [4].
4) Grand canonical MG (GCMG): In this type of MG, the
number of players who participate in the game can vary
since the players have the freedom of being active or
inactive at any round of the game. More precisely, in a
GCMG, agents would score their strategies as usual and
if the highest strategy score is below a certain threshold,
agents would abstain from playing the game for that
round of play. Any inactive agent re-enters the game
when participation becomes profitable. Consequently,
the attendance is calculated based on active players only
[4].
III. MG MODELS IN COMMUNICATION NETWORKS:
STATE-OF-THE-ART AND FUTURE POTENTIAL
APPLICATIONS
In this section, we first provide a brief summary of the state-
of-the-art, where MG is applied to solve the problems that
arise in communication networks. Future research directions
and open problems are discussed as well.
A. MG Models in Communication Networks: State-of-the-Art
1) Interference management: In [9], the authors investi-
gated distributed interference management in Cognitive Radio
(CR) networks using a novel MG-driven approach. They
propose a decentralized transmission control policy for sec-
ondary users, who share the spectrum with primary users
thus causing interference. In this work, secondary users play
an MG, selecting between two options, namely transmit or
not transmit. The winning group is determined based on the
interference experienced by the primary user. For instance, if
the majority transmits, the interference power measured at the
primary receiver exceeds the threshold so that the minority
3In exponential learning, the probability values are modified by following
a logit model-like formula. This formula contains exponential functions of
strategy score and the agent’s learning rate, which is a numerical constant
which might differ for each agent [6].
who does not transmit become the winners and vice versa,
ensuring that the minority always wins. At each round of play,
the primary receiver announces the winning group through
sending a control bit to secondary transmitters.
2) Wireless resource allocation and opportunistic spectrum
access: An example of wireless channel allocation using MG
can be found in [10] where an MG-based mechanism for
energy-efficient spectrum sensing in cognitive radio networks
(CRNs) is presented. The authors emphasize how the MG, due
to its self-organizing nature, befits to model such problems to
achieve cooperation and coordination gain without causing a
large signaling cost in a CRN. In the applied MG model, the
agents are the secondary users, who choose between sensing or
not sensing, in the process of detecting an idle channel. Two
different distributed learning algorithms are then developed
that are applied by the agents to converge into equilibrium
states characterized by pure and mixed strategy NE. In [11],
a multiple-choice MG (simplex game) is used to model the
resource allocation problem in heterogeneous networks, where
a large number of non-cooperative users compete for limited
radio resources. The existence of correlated equilibrium was
proved. Moreover, the authors compared the equilibria with
the optimal states using the concept of the price of anarchy.
3) Coordination in delay tolerant networks: In [12], an
MG-based model was applied to coordinate the relay activation
in delay tolerant networks in order to guarantee an efficient
resource consumption. In the MG model, relays act as the
players who decide to transmit (participate in relaying) or
not to transmit (not to participate in relaying). In their work,
the authors developed a stochastic learning algorithm that
converges to a desired equilibrium solution.
B. Potential Future Applications and Open Problems
As discussed in the previous section, most of the existing
work is focused on the application of MG models in cognitive
radio networks. The applications of MG for 5G SCNs remain
however unexplored. In what follows, we discuss some possi-
ble applications as well as open theoretical issues.
1) Computation offloading in small cell networks: With the
emergence of new mobile applications, it has become common
for small user devices to have computationally-intensive tasks,
such as image processing to perform. However, due to limited
computational capability and limited battery capacity, user
devices are not always capable of performing the desired task,
or doing so might become inefficient. This gives rise to the
idea of offloading such tasks to a remote server (e.g. the cloud),
which typically has much higher computational capability
than local devices. This idea is referred to as computational
offloading. Computational offloading is expected to save the
energy cost spent for local execution, thereby saving the
battery life of end user devices.
Despite great benefits, computation offloading also imposes
certain challenges. These include large communication costs
in terms of energy and latency, caused by the long distance
between users and cloud servers, which are typically located
outside the local network. Moreover, especially in dense SCNs,
excessive back-haul traffic might arise as a result of the large
5number of offloading requests being sent to cloud. Thus, in
such cases, computational offloading to nearby SBSs (known
as mobile-edge offloading) can be a better alternative for
users. On the other hand, utilizing the SBS resources for
computational offloading is an efficient way to make use of the
idle resources located in the widely available SBSs, especially
in dense networks [13].
The applicability of MG to study computational offloading
problem is well-justified: It is essentially a dynamic resource
allocation problem where users, non-cooperatively and self-
ishly, try to utilize the limited computational resources located
in the SBS. Moreover, users cannot communicate with each
other or observe each others actions. While any centralized
approach to solve such problem might be very inefficient,
an approach based on MG model is distributed and of low
cost. Besides, in an MG model, all players eventually exhibit
cooperative behavior as a collection, despite being selfish
individually.
In Section IV, we will present a novel MG-based model to
address the computational offloading problem in dense SCNs.
2) Transmission mode selection: Device-to-Device (D2D)
communication is considered as a building block in 5G net-
works. In D2D network underlaying an SCN, users have two
modes of transmission: (i) direct communication without using
the core network infrastructure, (ii) communication with the
aid of the base station as in regular cellular networks. Clearly,
the transmission mode selection problem can be modeled as an
MG, where users are modeled as agents and the two options
correspond to transmission via D2D mode or cellular mode.
Given limited resource, the reward of each mode (for instance
the throughput) then depends on the number of users selecting
that mode. Thus, the cut-off value that defines the minority
depends on factors such as number of interferers, number of
available direct channels, etc.
3) Multiple-choice games: It is clear that the current
state-of-the-art mostly use the basic MG, which limits the
agents to select between only two alternatives. Nonetheless,
in many practical resource allocation problems, the decision
is made among multiple choices. Examples include the chan-
nel selection or computation offloading problems where a
channel/computational server is selected from many potential
options.
4) Evolutionary variations of MG: In a basic MG, the
agents’ selected set of strategies do not evolve. In other words,
they stay fixed through out the iterations and are only scored
in each play so that the agents can learn the best strategy
for them. Hence, the basic iterated MG cannot be classified
as an evolutionary game, making it inapplicable to model the
problems where users should have the capability of altering
their given strategies. On the other hand, complex dynamic
systems require the agents to not only learn the best strategy
but also to adjust the strategies as the game advances in a
dynamic manner. To accomplish this, the modified versions
of the seminal MG such as evolutionary MG (EMG) can
be used. Other options include MG models that use learning
methods such as exponential learning to adjust the strategies.
The current state-of-the-art consists of very few applications
of such evolutionary variations of the MG, thus it can be noted
as a potential research direction.
5) MGs for players with heterogeneity: In a practical point
of view, it is very likely for the SCN users to be heterogeneous
and to have diverse QoS requirements (e.g. in terms of delay,
rate and energy efficiency). However, in the basic MG, every
player is assumed to have similar capabilities and uses iden-
tical information and learning methods. Thus, generalization
of the basic MG model to include such heterogeneities among
users can be considered as a potential line of research.
IV. COMPUTATION OFFLOADING IN SMALL CELL
NETWORKS: WHEN MINORITY WINS
A. System Model and Assumptions
We use a minority game with an arbitrary cut-off. Consider
an SBS serving N number of homogeneous (with respect
to both computational capability and the task potentially to
be offloaded) users. Each computational offloading period t
is considered to be a round of play of the MG. All users
participate as the players of the game and individually decide
whether they offload the task to the local SBS or they execute
it locally using their own resources. Users select one of these
two options simultaneously within each offloading period and
they have no information about other users’ actions. Note that
users naturally prefer to offload to the local SBS rather than
executing the tasks locally, provided that the local SBS does
not become crowded with offloading requests. The reason is
as follows. Analogous to the original bar problem [2] where
the customers naturally like to go to the bar than staying
home if the bar is uncrowded, we assume that by offloading
to an uncrowded SBS, users can experience lower latency.
The SBS supports all of the computation offloading requests
it receives, by completing all tasks in a TDMA manner.
(This can be done using virtual parallel processing, where
the time slot given to each task is small enough to assume
that all tasks are performed simultaneously.) Therefore, if the
number of offloading requests exceeds a certain threshold, the
latency experienced by users might increase, making local
computation to become the preferred option. Note that for the
sake of simplicity, we assume the amount of energy required
for the local computation is approximately equal to the amount
of transmission energy required for the offloading. Thus we
omit the energy parameter in this simplified model.
The problem described above is a distributed resource
allocation problem where we analyze how to optimally utilize
the computational resources of the local SBS while the latency
remains below a specific threshold. As conventional, we as-
sume that the local SBS has a fixed computational capability.
In each round, users have the two options of either offloading
or locally computing. The number of offloading requests that
the SBS can handle is an arbitrary cut-off value denoted by
φ. Clearly, this offloading threshold (φ) counts as the minority
rule of the game. Note that φ remains unknown to the users
throughout the game. For every user, Lth is the maximum
tolerable latency, which is experienced if the computation is
performed locally. Then the cut-off value φ is defined such
that, when the number of offloading users approaches φ, the
latency for offloading users reaches the threshold, Lth. Thus,
6for a user to benefit from offloading, the number of offloading
users should not exceed the limit of φ. As a result, being in
the population minority (defined by φ) is always desired. After
each round of play, one of the outcomes mentioned below
would occur.
• If minority chooses to offload and majority chooses to
compute locally: In this case, the minority receives a
reward since offloading yields lower latency than local
computation since the local SBS is uncrowded.
• If minority chooses to locally compute and majority
chooses to offload: In this case, the number of offloading
requests exceeds the threshold φ so that the SBS becomes
too crowded. Consequently, the latency for the offloading
users would exceed the allowable latency threshold. Thus
minority wins and receives a reward.
B. MG Model
1) Attendance: Conventionally in MG, the winning choice
is announced to all users after each round of play, so that users
take advantage of this information to score their strategies.
Accordingly, in our model, after each round of play, the SBS
broadcasts the winning group by sending an one-bit control
information b(t) defined as
b(t) =
{
1, if n(t) < φ
0, if n(t) ≥ φ (1)
where n(t) = number of offloading users at offloading period
t.
In accordance with the MG terminology, we refer to this
n(t) as the attendance. Given the control information, users
evaluate their strategies to improve decision making in the next
round of play.
2) Reward: The reward of each winning user is defined
based on the computation latency experienced by the user.
Note that the transmission delays and propagation delays are
considered negligible compared to computation latency. Thus
the reward depends on the number of other users who select
the same option, be it offloading or local computation.
• L(t) = Latency experienced by an offloading user at
offloading period t,
• Cb = Computation capability of SBS (in number of CPU
cycles per unit time),
• Cu = Computation capability of local user device (in
number of CPU cycles per unit time),
• M = Number of CPU cycles required to complete the
task.
Thus the latency experienced by an offloading user yields
L(t) = n(t) ·M/Cb, and the latency experienced by as locally
computing user is given as Lth = M/Cu. For L(t) = Lth,
n(t) = φ, hence φ = Cb/Cu. If L(t) ≥ Lth (equivalent
to n(t) ≥ φ), offloading users (majority) lose and locally
computing users (minority) win. In contrast, when L < Lth
(i.e. n(t) < φ), offloading users (minority) win and locally
computing users (majority) lose. Let Uo(t) and Ul(t) be the
utility each user, respectively receives in case of offloading
and local computing. Thus we have
Uo(t) = b(t) =
{
1, if n(t) < φ
0, if n(t) ≥ φ (2)
and
Ul(t) =
{
0, if n(t) < φ
1, if n(t) ≥ φ. (3)
3) Distributed Learning Algorithm: To solve the designed
MG, we use the reinforcement technique [3][4]. For the
comparison purposes, MG-based method is compared with a
random selection scenario.
Algorithm 1 Distributed learning algorithm to solve offloading
MG [3]
Initialization: Each user i randomly draws S strategies.
for t = 2 : T do
Each user i selects action ai(t) predicted by the best
strategy.
SBS broadcasts the control information b(t).
for s = 1 : S do
Each user i updates the score of the strategy s, Vi,s.
if prediction of s = b(t) then
Vi,s(t+ 1) = Vi,s(t) + 1,
else
Vi,s(t+ 1) = Vi,s(t).
end if
end for
Each user i selects best strategy si(t), defined as
argmax
s∈S
Vi,s(t)
t← t+ 1
end for
It is shown in [6] that using this basic MG model results
in naive behavior of agents since they do not account for
their market impact4, which makes the system unable to attain
NE. In this work, we simply use the self-organizing capability
of basic MG around the cut-off, even with its naive agents.
Future work can explore more generalized versions of MG
models that attain NE with sophisticated agents who account
for market impact.
C. Simulation Results and Discussion
For numerical analysis, we consider an SBS serving N = 31
users. The task that the users have to perform is assumed
to require M = 10 Megacycles of CPU cycles. The CPU
capacity of each user device is Cu = 0.5 GHz. Moreover, the
SBS allocates Cb = 10 GHz of CPU capacity to serve users’
offloading requests. Hence the system’s cut-off value becomes
φ = Cb/Cu = 20. Thus, if the attendance is less than 20, the
offloading users win, and vice versa. We simulate the system
for different brain sizes (m) to observe the system behavior.
4In this model, agents respond to the aggregate action of all agents in the
previous round, which also contains their own actions. Thus the naive agents
do not account for their own actions, which is referred to as market impact
[6].
7For each m value, 32 runs are carried out, where each time,
users randomly draw a new set of strategies (S = 2). In each
of the 32 runs, T = 10000 offloading periods (rounds of MG)
are executed. For comparison, we also implement the random
choice game where users select one of the two actions (to
offload or not) with equal probabilities at each round of the
game.
The variation of attendance over time for different brain
sizes (m) are shown in Fig. 1. From the figure it is clear
that the number of offloading users always fluctuate near
the cut-off value, when users play an MG. It implies that
the system self-organizes into a state where the number of
users who experience a latency less than the threshold is
near its maximum value, thereby maintaining the optimal SBS
utilization. This is interesting since the users are not given
any prior information about the exact cut-off value of the
system. As mentioned earlier, fluctuation of the attendance
(i.e., the standard deviation) is known as the volatility in MG
literature. It is clear that for different m values, the amount
of fluctuation differs as explained in Fig. 2 (see below). Note
that the fluctuations correspond to the amount of cooperation
in the MG. They provide a measure for the number of users
who could have offloaded if the attendance is lower than the
cut-off or for the number of agents who could have not selected
offloading option, if the attendance exceeds the cut-off. From
the attendance figures, it can be seen that, even though the cut-
off value is not advertised to the agents, the population adapts
to the cut-off value of the system. The reason for this behavior
is the agents’ adaptation to the environment they collectively
create.
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Fig. 1. Time evolution of attendance
Fig. 2 shows that the variation of the standard deviation
(σ/N ) of the number of offloading users over different m
values follows the expected MG behavior [1][4][5], described
in the following. As discussed, the volatility corresponds to
the fluctuations of the attendance and serves as an established
measure for the system performance. Lower volatility values
mean that the fluctuations around the cut-off decrease. This
corresponds to the size of the minority being larger, resulting
in a larger number of winners, thus a better performance.
Accordingly, lower volatility corresponds to better resource
utilization and higher user satisfaction. From Fig. 2, for almost
all values of m, volatility is lower than that of the random
choice game. Hence one can conclude that the resource
utilization is improved when MG-based offloading method is
used. This shows the self-organizing nature of the MG, where
agents coordinate to reduce the fluctuations in the absence of
any communication or information other than the history data.
It can also be seen that a minimum of the average volatility
occurs at m = 3, where the phase transition from the crowded
phase to the uncrowded phase occurs.
m
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
</N
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
MG
Random
Fig. 2. Variation of volatility with m
To investigate the improvement in the latency experienced
by the users, average utility is shown in Fig. 3. It is clear
that for MG, the utility achieved by individual users is better
than that of the random choice game. However, it can be
seen that the average utility received by a user who applies
MG-based offloading is still lower than that of an optimal
situation, where the number of offloading users is always equal
to φ−1 (here 19). This is the price of the lack of coordination
between agents and the use of minimal external information.
Fig. 4 depicts the influence of the brain size on the average
utility achieved per user. As expected, for larger volatility
values, the achieved utility is substantially smaller. Roughly
speaking, Fig. 4 is approximately an inverse of the volatility
figure (Fig. 2). Thus, once more we come to the conclusion
that the volatility is indeed an inverse performance measure
for the MG-based system.
In Fig. 5, we illustrate the benefit of MG-based offload-
ing. When the MG-based offloading mechanism is used, the
number of users who experience latency below the threshold
fluctuates near its maximum value (φ − 1 = 19, in this
example), compared to the two general cases where all users
simply offload or compute the task locally. In the last two
cases, none of the users is able to achieve a latency below
the threshold. Using our defined model, if all users offload,
the latency experienced by each user yields 31 milliseconds.
Similarly, if all users choose to compute locally, the latency is
20 milliseconds. Since the threshold latency is 20 milliseconds,
it is clear that none of the above two methods would allow the
users to experience latency values below the threshold. Con-
sequently, using an MG-based approach results in achieving
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some latency below the threshold for a larger number of users,
thereby utilizing the available SBS resources in a productive
manner.
V. CONCLUSION
We have presented the basics of minority game models and
their applications in communication networks. Also, future
potential applications and open research issues have been
outlined. As a potential application of minority games in
5G small cell networks, we have investigated the distributed
mobile computation offloading problem and some preliminary
results have been presented. In mobile-edge computation of-
floading, users typically have several resources to offload to;
these include local device, SBS, MBS, D2D offloading or the
cloud [13]. To model such cases, multi-option MG (simplex
game) can be used. Also, in practice, users can have a variety
of devices with varying computational and battery capacities
(e.g., smart phones, tablets, laptops); thus MG models that
incorporate different user types can be employed to model
such scenarios. Apart from the conventional method, different
learning techniques such as biased [14] and adaptive [15]
strategies can be adopted to achieve better performance.
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